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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 970012-CA
Priority No. 2

v.
DANIEL K. RIGGS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appealsfromconvictions of three counts of automobile homicide, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (1995), and one count of receiving
or transferring a stolen vehicle, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41la-1316 (1993). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Was giving the jury a standard flight instruction reversible error where
defendant's flight was relevant to show that he knew he was intoxicated while driving and
where the other uncontroverted evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming?

1

Standard of Review: The giving of a jury instruction is reviewed for correctness.
State v. Gibson. 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied. 917 P.2d 556 (Utah
1996). The instructions, however, must be reviewed "in their entirety to determine whether
the instructions, when considered as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law."
Salt Lake City v. Smoot. 921 P.2d 1003,1006 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 925 P.2d 963 (Utah
1996).
Issue 2: Did the trial court err in refusing to suppress defendant's un-Mirandized
statement to Deputy Stratford, where the statement was spontaneous and not elicited by
interrogation?
Standard of Review: A trial court's factual findings underlying the denial of a motion
to suppress are reviewed for clear error, while the conclusions of law are reviewed for
correctness. State v. GallL 967 P.2d 930, 933 (Utah 1998). However, because of the
variability of the factual settings involving whether a statement is the product of a custodial
interrogation in violation of Miranda.1 the trial court's conclusions on this issue should be
granted "a measure of discretion." See State v. Levva. 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1997)
(holding that trial court afforded "measure of discretion" in its legal conclusions on whether
there has been a valid waiver of Miranda rights).

]

Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).
2

Smithson, Lambrou, and James all later died at the hospital from injuries sustained
in the car accident (R. 08, 1675, 1707-09, 1726, 1739, 1753, 1756-57).
Motion to Suppress
The afternoon of the accident, staff at the hospital treating defendant informed police
that someone had made threats against defendant's life (R. 1123, 1126-27, 1132, 1136,
1983). Hospital officials were concerned that defendant's family would take defendant from
the hospital against medical advice (R. 1123, 1126, 1132). Sheriffs Deputy Brad Hunter
arrived at the hospital at about 3:00 p.m. to guard defendant (R. 1150, 1151-52). When
defendant asked why the deputy was there, Hunter said he had heard that defendant was
threatening to leave and he was there to keep defendant at the hospital (R. 1151,1153,1155).
Deputy Hunter remained in defendant's hospital room for about two to two and onehalf hours (R. 1151, 1156). For about an hour of that time, Deputy Hunter and defendant
engaged in "general conversation" (R. 1151-52; 1154-55). During this conversation,
defendant spontaneously remarked that his sister had seen him on the news (R. 495, 1154).
Deputy Hunter merely responded that he "didn't know much about what happened" (R. 495,
1154). Defendant also volunteered that he had been "driving a stolen '94 . . . Ford Ranger
extended cab with some other friends," that they had "passed a cop car. And when he saw
the cop car somebody told him to go, so he sped up and got approximately [75] miles an hour
and went through the red light. And that's when the accident happened" (R. 496,1151-52).

7

Defendant then boasted that but for the accident, "he probably would have lost the cop" (R.
496, 1152).6
Deputy Hunter did not interrogate defendant, nor did he ask defendant any specific
questions concerning the accident (R. 1150, 1155, 1157, 494). Hunter also did not give
defendant any Miranda warnings (R. 494, 1156).
Later that day, Deputy Larry Stratford, the lead investigator of the accident, arrived
at the hospital "to find out the problem with the threats . . . [and] try and obtain [defendant's]
side of the story to find out his version of what happened" (R. 1124, 1126, 1133, 1152).
Hunter was still there (R. 1152, 1124-25). Upon entering the room, Deputy Stratford asked
if defendant remembered the accident (R. 497,1133,1135). Before defendant could respond,
a news story about the accident came on the television, and both officers turned to watch the
report, ignoring defendant (R. 1125, 1135, 497-98). Three to four minutes later, defendant
blurted out that he "knew the car was stolen before the officer turned his lights on and they
decided to run from him" (R. 1125, 1134,1135,497). Defendant added that he did not know
that a gun in the truck was loaded and that he knew nothing about his passengers'

6

The trial court's written findings of fact on these statements suggest that they
were made after the later arrival of Deputy Stratford (R. 495). Deputy Hunter expressly
testified, however, that these statements were made while Hunter was alone with
defendant and that they were made before Deputy Stratford's arrived (R.l 151-52).
Moreover, the parties' oral arguments and the trial court's oral findings on the motion to
suppress make clear that both parties and the trial court understood that these statements
were made only to Hunter and were not part of or the same statements later made to
Deputy Stratford (R. 1205-06, 1207, 1225-26, 1258-59, 1341, 1343).
8

commission of a burglary earlier that evening (R. 1125).7 Stratford formally arrested
defendant later that evening on some outstanding warrants (R. 1129-30).
A few days later, Deputy Dirk Roesler conversed casually with defendant while
guarding him in his hospital room (R. 1138-39). At one point defendant spontaneously
stated, "I did it; I'm guilty as hell" (R. 1140, 500). Roesler did not question defendant about
the accident, nor did he give defendant any Miranda warnings (R. 1139-40, 1147, 1148).
Defendant moved to suppress all his statements to police while he was in the hospital
on the ground that they were taken in violation of Miranda (R. 40). After conducting a
lengthy evidentiary hearing and making extensive factual findings, the trial court denied the
motion (R. 369,460-506). The trial court specifically found that defendant was-in custody
the entire time he was in the hospital and that he did not receive any Miranda warnings
before he made any of his statements (R. 1201; 505). The court found none of defendant's
statements were taken in violation of Miranda, however, because they were voluntary and
spontaneous and not made in response to an interrogation (R. 495-96,497-98,505-06,1258).
(The trial court's written findings of fact and conclusions of law are reproduced in
Addendum B; the court's oral ruling is reproduced in Addendum C).
Additional relevant facts are included in the argument section.

7

Stratford testified that when defendant began these statements the two deputies
were not talking with or paying attention to defendant, but were conversing with each
other (R. 1125-26,1135).
9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I:

Defendant's flight from the police officer created a legitimate and

permissible inference that defendant had a consciousness of guilt regarding his level of
intoxication. This inference was relevant both to the lesser included offense instruction of
driving while under the influence and to whether defendant had acted with criminal
negligence with respect to the automobile homicides. The flight instruction was therefore
proper to inform the jury that defendant's flight was one of many factors that it could
consider in determining whether defendant was driving while under the influence and his
level of negligence with respect to the automobile homicides.
Even if giving the flight instruction was error, it was harmless. When viewed in the
context of all the instructions, it is unlikely that the flight instruction confused the jury
regarding the elements it must find to convict defendant or regarding what constituted
criminal negligence as opposed to simple negligence. Moreover, contrary to defendant's
assertions, no reasonable view of the uncontroverted facts before the jury would have
justified a finding that defendant was guilty of only simple negligence.
Point II: The Court need not reach the merits of defendant's claim that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to Deputy Stratford because any error
was harmless. Defendant's incriminating statements to Stratford were essentially cumulative
to the incriminating statements that he made earlier to Deputy Hunter. Since defendant has
not challenged on appeal the admissibility of his statements to Deputy Hunter, there is no
10

reasonable probability that defendant could obtain a more favorable outcome even if he
prevails on this issue.
Alternatively, the trial court properly refused to suppress the statements to Deputy
Stratford because they were not the product of custodial interrogation.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTION WAS PROPER IN THIS CASE
BECAUSE IT WENT TO DEFENDANT'S CONSCIOUSNESS OF
GUILT THAT HE WAS DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF ALCOHOL; EVEN IF ERROR, THE INSTRUCTION WAS
HARMLESS
The trial court gave the jury the following standard flight instruction:
The flight or attempted flight of a person immediately after the
commission of a crime or after that person is accused of a crime that has been
committed, is not sufficient in itself to establish the defendant's guilt.
However, such flight, if proved, may be considered by you in light of all other
proven facts in the case in determining guilt or innocence.
Although consciousness of guilt may be inferred from flight, it does not
necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime charged, and there may be reasons
for flight fully consistent with innocence. Therefore, whether or not evidence
of flight shows a consciousness of guilt and the significance, if any, to be
attached to any such evidence are matters exclusively within the province of
the jury.
(R. 768; Addendum D). Defendant objected to the instruction on the ground that any
"flight" occurred before the accident and therefore could not support a finding of
"consciousness of guilt" for the charged crime of automobile homicide (R. 2167). The trial

11

court ruled that the instruction was proper as the jury could infer from defendant's flight that
he had a consciousness of guilt that he was intoxicated (R. 2159).
Defendant renews his argument that because his flight occurred before the accident,
it could not, as a matter of logic, create an inference that he had a consciousness of guilt of
automobile homicide. Brief of Appellant [hereinafter "Br. Aplt."] at 10-11. Defendant
claims that the instruction was prejudicial because it could have caused the jury to
improperly infer that he "had a consciousness of guilt of automobile homicide" when he fled
from the police officer and that this could have led the jury to find that defendant acted with
criminal negligence instead of simple negligence. Br. Aplt. 13.
The trial court correctly ruled that defendant's flight created a consciousness guilt that
he was intoxicated. This was a legitimate and logical inference under the facts of this case.
Although defendant's flight occurred before the deaths, it occurred after the commission of
the lesser-included offense of driving while under the influence. The instruction was also
proper with respect to the automobile homicide charges because defendant's consciousness
of guilt regarding his intoxication while driving was directly related to whether he was acting
with criminal or simple negligence, an element of the crime charged. Even if giving the
flight instruction was error, it was at most harmless.
A. When flight instructions are appropriate.
Flight instructions, such as the one given in this case, have long been approved when
they are supported by the evidence. E^g,, State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 574-75 (Utah 1983);
12

State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 38-39 (Utah 1987); State v. Gonzalez. 517 P.2d 547, 548
(Utah 1973): see also State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991). Nevertheless, as this
Court has explained, flight instructions are proper only when evidence of the flight gives rise
to a legitimate inference of a "consciousness of guilt" of the crime charged. State v.
Howland. 761 P.2d 579, 580-81 (UtahApp. 1988): see also Fisher v. Trapp. 748 P.2d 204.
206-07 (Utah App. 1988) (civil case finding that evidence of flight irrelevant because in that
case inference of defendant's negligence did not arise from his failure to stop at scene of
accident). A classic example of when a flight creates an inference of a "consciousness of
guilt" is if a defendant driving a stolen vehicle flees rather than stopping when signaled by
police. The flight in that circumstance suggests that the driver knows the vehicle is stolen
and that his flight is to avoid detection. See, e.g.. Gonzalez. 517 P.2d at 548 (flight
instruction proper in telling jury that it could consider defendant's flight along with other
facts in determining guilt for car theft); see also Bales. 678 P.2d at 575 (defendant's flight
from burglary scene when police arrived justified flight instruction); see generally James.
819 P.2d at 789 (flight or concealment shows guilty conscious of accused as a result of crime
committed).
Defendant correctly points out that an inference of a consciousness of guilt ordinarily
arises when the flight occurs after the crime has been committed. !See Howland. 761 P.2d
at 580-81. Thus, in Howland. this Court held that a flight instruction was improper because
the flight occurred before commission of the crime charged. Id. There, the manager of a
13

fast-food restaurant discovered defendant lurking behind the restaurant by a garbage
dumpster. Id., at 580. The defendant refused to leave when asked and threatened to kill the
manager's family. A fist fight ensued until the defendant broke free and ran toward a nearby
store with the manager in pursuit. The manager caught the defendant outside the store and
the two wrestled until the manager placed the defendant in a headlock and held him until
police could arrive. A person arriving at the store saw the defendant pulling a knife from a
sheath on his belt. As the defendant held the knife five inches out of the sheath, the witness
grabbed his wrist and pried the knife from his hand. Id
The Howland jury received a flight instruction similar to the one given in this case.8
Id. This Court held that it was error to give that instruction "because no flight occurred after
commission of the crime charged." Id. The Court observed that although it was "arguable
that a simple assault occurred in the initial encounter at the dumpster," the defendant was
charged with aggravated assault for using the knife, and not with simple assault arising out
of the incident by the dumpster. Id The Court reasoned that because no flight occurred after

8

The only significant difference between the two instructions is that the Howland
instruction did not advise the jury that there may be reasons for flight fully consistent
with innocence and that even if consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it does not
necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime charged. Howland, 761 P.2d at 580. These
omissions rendered the flight instruction defective under Bales, 675 P.2d at 575.
Howland, 761 P.2d at 580 n.l. Defendant acknowledges that the flight instruction in this
case is a correct one under the law. Br. Aplt. 11 n.5. He challenges only the propriety of
giving a flight instruction in this case.
14

the assault became aggravated, which was the sole crime to be determined by the jury, it was
error to instruct the jury on flight. Id. at 581.
The Court's overriding concern in Howland was that a flight instruction must bear
some logical relationship to the evidence. Id, at 580-81. In other words, the flight to which
the instruction relates must be susceptible to a legitimate inference of a consciousness of guilt
with respect to the crime before the jury. Id.; see also Fisher, 748 P.2d at 206-07. The flight
in Howland bore no such relationship to the crime of aggravated assault, the only crime
before the jury.
Nevertheless, Howland plainly implies that if that defendant had been charged with
the simple assault occurring at the dumpster or if the jury had been given a lesser included
offense instruction on simple assault, the flight instruction might have been justified. This
is because the defendant's flight in that case bore a logical relationship to the incident at the
dumpster, if not to the later aggravated assault.
The critical question in whether to give a flight instruction, then, is not so much when
the flight took place as it is to whether the flight gives rise to an inference of a consciousness
of guilt that is logically related to the crime or crimes before the jury.
B. The flight instruction was proper in this case.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the flight instruction was proper in this case for two
reasons. First, the trial court gave the jury a lesser included offense instruction for driving
while under the influence of alcohol (R. 773, 777, 778, 779, 785, 791). Thus, although
15

defendant was charged only with automobile homicide, the jury was given the option of
convicting him of the lesser crime of driving under the influence (R. 773, 777, 778, 783).
Defendant's flight from the police officer gave rise to a legitimate and logical inference that
defendant fled because he had a consciousness of guilt that he was driving while intoxicated
and he wished to evade arrest. The flight instruction was thus proper to inform the jury that
defendant's flight was one among many facts in evidence that it could consider in
determining whether defendant was guilty of the lesser included offense of driving under the
influence.9 See Howland. 761 P.2d at 580-81.
Second, the inference that defendant fled because of a consciousness of guilt
regarding his intoxication was highly relevant to a finding of guilt on the automobile
homicide charges, notwithstanding that the flight occurred before the homicides. To convict

9

Defendant argues that a consciousness of his level of intoxication was not an
appropriate inference because the instruction was not so limited and because there were
alterative explanations for the flight, such as the fact that defendant was driving a stolen
truck, there was a loaded gun in the truck, and some of defendant's passengers had been
involved in a burglary earlier that evening. Br. Aplt. 13. Although it might have been
better to narrow the instruction, it was not necessary in this case because the only
reasonable inference the jury could have drawn from the flight here was that defendant
fled because he did not want to be arrested for driving under the influence. The jury was
never told that there was a loaded gun in the truck or that there had been a burglary earlier
(R. 1271-72, 1424-25). The jury was also never explicitly told that the truck was stolen,
only that the license plates belonged to another vehicle (R. 1391-95, 1424-25, 1684).
Although the jury sent a note to the judge asking whether the truck was stolen, they were
instructed to not speculate or consider the status of the truck because it was not relevant to
their deliberations (R. 806). Consequently, the only rational inference the jury could have
drawn from the flight was that defendant fled to avoid arrest for driving while under the
influence.
16

defendant of second degree felony automobile homicide, the jury had to find that 1)
defendant was driving while having a blood alcohol level of .08 per cent or greater or while
under the influence of alcohol to a degree that he was unable to safely operate the vehicle,
and 2) defendant caused the death of another by operating the vehicle in a criminally
negligent manner (R. 773, 780, 786). Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2) (1995). As stated,
defendant's flight raised a permissible inference that he had a consciousness of guilt with
respect to his level of intoxication. This was relevant not only to a finding of the first
element of the automobile homicide charges, but it was also probative to a determination of
whether defendant's operation of the truck rose to the level of criminal negligence, the
second element of the charged crimes. The flight suggested that defendant was conscious
that he was sufficiently under the influence that he should not have been driving. The choice
to drive despite this knowledge is one of many factors that the jury was entitled to consider
in determining the level of defendant's negligence.
In sum, given the high relevance of defendant's flight to the level of his intoxication
and negligence, it was proper for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could consider
defendant's flight as one of many factors in determining guilt.
C. Even if erroneous, giving the flight instruction was not prejudicial.
Even if giving the flight instruction was error, it was not prejudicial because there is
not a reasonable likelihood that absent the instruction the result would have been any
different. State v. Brafford, 663 P.2d 68, 70 (Utah 1983) (per curiam) (holding giving of
17

flight instruction harmless in that case); see also State v. Bredehoft. 966 P.2d 285,294 (Utah
App. 1998) ("harmless error is that "sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable
likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings").
Defendant speculates that the instruction "possibly" confused the jury and caused it
to infer that defendant had a consciousness of guilt that he had killed three people. Br. Aplt.
13. Defendant reasons that this in turn might have caused the jury to improperly infer that
defendant had a knowing mental state, thereby causing the jury to find him guilty of criminal
negligence instead of simple negligence. Br. Aplt. 13. In other words, defendant claims that
the flight instruction alone caused the jury to convict him of second degree felony automobile
homicide instead of the lesser included offense of third degree felony automobile homicide.
Viewing the jury instructions as a whole renders defendant's argument improbable
at best. See State v. Ruben. 663 P.2d 445, 449-50 (Utah 1983) ("we have reiterated
innumerable times one instruction should not be considered in isolation in order to predicate
a claim of error upon it, but the instructions must be read and understood as a connected
whole"); Salt Lake Citv v. Smoot 921 P.2d 1003,1006 (Utah App. 1996) (jury instructions
must be read and viewed in the aggregate).
First, the idea that the jury would infer from defendant's flight that he knew he had
killed someone is illogical. Because the only flight in this case occurred before the
homicides, it would not be rational to assume that defendant fled because he felt guilty about
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killing someone. Thus, it wo.ild be highly improbable that any of the jurors would make
such an inference.
Second, the flight instruction itself made clear that the flight was "not sufficient in
itself to establish the defendant's guilt" (R. 768). Rather, the flight, "if proved, may be
considered by you in light of all other proven facts in the case in determining guilt or
innocence" (R. 768). The flight instruction also explained that even though a "consciousness
of guilt may be inferred from flight, it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime
charged," but that "there may be reasons for flight fully consistent with innocence" (R. 768).
The instruction further explained that the jury was the exclusive judge of what significance,
if any to be attached to the flight (R. 768). In other words, the jury was expressly told that
evidence of defendant's flight was not conclusive, or even presumptive, evidence of
defendant's guilt, but was only one of many factors that jury could consider in reaching a
verdict.
The jury was also instructed that to convict defendant of second degree felony
automobile homicide, it must find that defendant operated the vehicle in a criminally
negligent manner in addition to his being intoxicated (R. 773,780,786). The jury was given
the option of convicting defendant of third degree felony automobile homicide, if it found
that defendant had acted with only simple negligence as opposed to criminal negligence (R.
773, 776, 782, 788).
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The instructions carefully defined the differences between criminal and simple
negligence (R. 792, 793). The jury was instructed that the level of negligence must be
determined "in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint" (R. 792, 793).
The instructions also informed the jury that the level of defendant's negligence was a distinct
and separate element from the element of driving while under the influence and that even if.
the jury determined that defendant was driving while intoxicated, it "must also consider
separately whether he acted in a negligent or criminally negligent manner which caused a
death" (R. 794).
The instructions stated that it was unlawful to refuse to stop or to flee when a police
officer gives a visual or audible signal to stop (R. 766), and that the law requires drivers to
keep a "proper lookout" (R. 795). The instructions further explained that although "violation
of a statute can be evidence of simple negligence or criminal negligence," the jury served as
the "exclusive judges of weight to which the evidence is entitled (R. 767). The jury was also
told to disregard any inapplicable instruction (R. 797) and not to place emphasis on any
single instruction, but to read and apply the instructions as a whole (R. 800). The flight
instruction was one of fifty instructions (R. 768, 744-804).
In view of the other instructions, none of which is challenged by defendant, it is
unlikely that the flight instruction alone confused the jury regarding the difference between
criminal and simple negligence and what it needed to find to properly convict defendant.
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Even without regard to the other instructions, no reasonable view of the evidence in
this case would have justified the jury in finding defendant guilty of only simple negligence
as opposed to criminal negligence. The jury was correctly instructed that a person acts with
criminal negligence
with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his
conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) (1995); (R. 792). In contrast, the jury was told that "simple
negligence" is simply "the failure to exercise that degree of care that a reasonable and
prudent person exercise under like or similar circumstances." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5207(l)(b);(R.793).
The uncontroverted evidence showed that defendant was driving with a blood alcohol
level of almost twice the legal limit (R. 1962-63,1939). Although signaled by police to pull
over, he chose instead to flee, first by driving over two residential lawns, and then by
recklessly speeding through a residential area 55 mph over the speed limit (R. 1686-93,
1828-30). While it is true that defendant braked slightly before the intersection, he then
accelerated through the red light (R. 1692-93, 1831-32, 1834). Defendant himself
acknowledged to Deputy Hunter that he had reached a speed of 75 mph when he went
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through the red light and that but for the accident, "he probably would have lost the cop" (R.
496; 1151-52).
Nothing in these facts suggest that defendant's conduct constituted mere simple
negligence. Rather, these facts conclusively add up to a "gross deviation" from the standard
of care that would have been exercised by an ordinary person under the same circumstances.
That gross deviation resulted in a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a violent accident
would occur and that three people would be killed.
Thus, giving the flight instruction, even if error, was harmless.10
10

Relying on Francis v. Franklin, 105 S.Ct. 1965 (1985), defendant makes an
alternative argument that the flight instruction violated his Due Process rights under the
federal constitution because it created a "permissive inference" that was not justified by
"reason and common sense." Br. Aplt. 13-15. Defendant contends that the instruction
therefore presented a constitutional error requiring the State to show harmlessness beyond
a reasonable doubt. Br. Aplt. 15.
Defendant's reliance on Francis is misplaced. That case dealt with a jury
instruction that created a mandatory presumption regarding the murder defendant's intent.
Id. at 1974. The Court held that such an instruction erroneously shifts the constitutional
burden of proof from the State to the defendant. IcL at 1971-73. The Court distinguished
instructions that create mandatory presumptions from those that merely create a
permissive inference: "A permissive inference suggests to the jury a possible conclusion
to be drawn if the State proves predicate facts, but does not require the jury to draw that
conclusion." Id at 1971. The Court explained that a permissive inference does not
relieve the State of its burden of persuasion and therefore "violates the Due Process
Clause only if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify
in light of the proven facts before the jury." Id.
Defendant does not contend that the instruction at issue here created a mandatory
presumption. See Bellmore v. State, 602N.E.2d 111, 119 (Ind. 1992) (quotingFrancis,
417 U.S. at 315, 105 S.Ct. at 1971) (similar flight instruction "could not 'reasonably have
been understood as creating a presumption that relieves the State of its burden of
persuasion on an element of the offense'"). Moreover, as already explained, the flight
instruction did not create an unjustifiable "permissive inference," because under the facts
22

POINT II
DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS
STATEMENTS TO DEPUTY STRATFORD WAS HARMLESS;
ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRIAL COURT REASONABLY
CONCLUDED THAT DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS TO DEPUTY
STRATFORD WAS NOT IN RESPONSE TO INTERROGATION
The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress with respect to all his statements
to Deputies Stratford, Hunter, and Roesler (R. 369,495-96, 597-98, 505,1258). On appeal,
defendant challenges only the denial of his motion to suppress with respect to his
incriminating statements to Deputy Stratford. Br. Aplt. 15-24. Defendant contends that the
trial court erroneously found that his statements to Deputy Stratford were not the result of
custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda. Br. Aplt. 17-24.11

of this case the jury could reasonably and rationally infer that defendant fled from police
because he wished to avoid arrest for driving while under the influence. Furthermore, the
flight instruction in this case would not have caused the jury to infer that defendant was
guilty solely because he had a "consciousness of automobile homicide." The instruction
expressly stated that the jury could not infer guilt solely from the fact of flight (R. 768).
In addition, the jury would not have inferred that defendant fled because he felt guilty
over the homicides because the accident had not yet happened. Finally, the flight
instruction was not such, when viewed in the context of all the instructions, that the jury
would have misunderstood or been confused regarding the elements that it had to find to
convict defendant of second degree felony automobile homicide.
In any event, as explained above, any error was harmless, even beyond a
reasonable doubt, because under the facts of this case the jury could not have reasonably
found defendant guilty only of simple negligence.
1

defendant's challenge to the admissibility of his statements is relevant only to his
conditional guilty plea to receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle. Br. Aplt. 15 n.7.
Thus, resolution of this issue does not affect defendant's convictions for automobile
homicide.
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This Court should affirm defendant's guilty plea because even if his statements to
Deputy Stratford should have been suppressed, the failure to do so was harmless. In any
event, the trial court reasonably determined that defendant's statement was spontaneous and
not in response to any interrogation.
A. Failure to suppress defendant's statements to Deputy Stratford was harmless.
Defendant made three incriminating statements to Deputy Stratford: 1) defendant
knew the car was stolen before the officer had turned his lights on and "they decided to run
from him;" 2) defendant did not know the gun was loaded and that one of the passengers had
brought it; and 3) defendant was just taking his passengers home and knew nothing about the
burglary that his passengers had committed earlier (R. 1125). Because the second and third
statements do not relate in any way to the receiving the motor vehicle charge, the sole
statement at issue here is defendant's first statement, that defendant knew the red pickup
truck was stolen.
The Court need not reach the merits of defendant's claim of a Miranda violation
because the refusal to suppress that statement was harmless. See State v. White, 851 P.2d
1195, 1201 (Utah App. 1993) (refusing to reach merits of defendant's defective warrant
claim where any error was harmless). Before Deputy Stratford arrived at the hospital,
defendant had already admitted to Deputy Hunter that at the time of the accident he had been
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"driving a stolen '94 Ford Ranger extended cab" (R. 495-96, 1151-52) (emphasis added).12
This was in substance the same incriminating statement later made to Stratford that defendant
now challenges. Defendant, however, has not challenged on appeal any of the statements
that he made to Deputy Hunter. Br. Aplt. 15-24. Consequently, even if the statement to
Deputy Stratford had been suppressed, there is not a reasonable probability that defendant
could expect a better outcome because the same statement would be admissible through
Deputy Hunter. See State v. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1274 (Utah App. 1996).
Citing to Lindgren, defendant asserts that "[n]o harmful error analysis is possible" in
the conditional plea context. Br. Aplt. 24. Defendant misapprehends Lindgren's holding.
That case expressly held that a harmless error analysis is applicable in conditional plea cases.
Lindgren entered a guilty plea to aggravated sexual abuse of a child conditioned upon his
right to appeal the trial court's pretrial evidentiary ruling excluding evidence critical to the
defense. Id at 1270-71. After ruling that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence, this
Court noted that it would "reverse only if the error were harmful" Id at 1273. The Court
explained that a finding of harmlessness required an appellate court "to determine from the
record what evidence would have been before the jury absent the trial court's error." Id at
1274. The Court then concluded that it could not tell whether the error was harmless in that
case because the record was not adequate for such a determination. Id This was because

12

See footnote 6, supra.
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after the trial court had made its evidentiary ruling, Lindgren entered his conditional plea and
there was no trial or other evidentiary hearing to develop the facts that would have been
presented to the jury. Id.
Lindgren, then, did not create a per se rule that a harmless error analysis never applies
or is impossible in a conditional plea case. Rather, it held that a harmless error analysis was
proper in the conditional plea context so long as the record was adequate to allow an
appellate court to assess harmlessness. Id. at 1274. See also State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012,
1017 (Utah App. 1993) (finding admission ofpre-Miranda statement harmless in conditional
guilty plea case where court already determined that substantially similar second, postMiranda statement was admissible); White, 851 P.2d at 1196,1201 (applying harmless error
analysis to one of defendant's claims on appeal from conditional guilty plea).
Unlike the record in Lindgren, the record in this case is more than adequate to
determine that not suppressing defendant's statement to Deputy Stratford was harmless.13
13

The standard for determining whether nonconstitutional error is harmful is
whether "'absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable
to the defendant.'" Lindgren, 910 P.2d at 1273 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1221 (Utah 1993)); State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1213 n.12 (Utah 1989). Constitutional
error is reviewed under a "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. State v.
Villareal, 889 P.2d 419, 425 (Utah 1995); State v. Genovisi, 909 P.2d 916, 922 (Utah
App. 1995). Here, defendant has not claimed that his statement was coerced in violation
of his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. He argues only that
his statement was taken in violation of Miranda. The Utah Supreme Court has held that a
noncoercive Miranda violation such as occurred here does not equate with a constitutional
violation. State v. Trover, 910 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Utah 1995). Because defendant has not
made a constitutional claim, (and indeed the facts do not support such a claim) the
appropriate standard is whether absent the claimed error there would have been a
26

The facts that would have been before the jury had this charge gone to trial were not only
explained in the probable cause statement of the information, but they were also fully
developed at the trial on the automobile homicide charges and at the motion to suppress
hearing. The information alleged that the truck had been stolen from its owner and that the
owner would testify that defendant did not have the owner's permission to drive the truck (R.
08-09). It was uncontroverted at the suppression hearing and at trial that the plates on the
truck belonged to another vehicle, suggesting that the truck was stolen (R. 996,1684). It was
also uncontroverted that defendant fled Officer Bairett, suggesting that defendant had a
"consciousness of guilt" that the truck was stolen (R. 997-1002,1684-93). Finally, and most
importantly, because defendant has not challenged the admissibility of defendant's statement
to Deputy Hunter, the jury would have heard that defendant told Deputy Hunter that he was
driving a stolen truck at the time of the accident (R. 1151-52, 1210). Thus, at most,
defendant's statement to Deputy Stratford was merely cumulative to the one he made to
Deputy Hunter.
Given the foregoing evidence and defendant's incriminating statement to Deputy
Hunter, the failure to suppress defendant's incriminating statement to Deputy Stratford was
harmless, even beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Kiriluk, amended opinion, slip op.
no. 971200-CA at 4-5,ffl[11, 12 (Utah App. February 11, 1999) (defendant's statements

reasonable probability of a different outcome. Nevertheless, as explained below, any
error in this case meets the harmlessness criteria under both standards.
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allegedly taken in violation of Miranda harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where
statements were primarily cumulative); James, 85 8 P.2d at 1017 (harmless error to admit first
pre-Miranda statement because it was merely cumulative to second, properly admitted postMiranda statement).
B. Defendant's statement was not the product of interrogation.
If the Court reaches the merits of this issue, it should affirm the denial of defendant's
motion to suppress because, as the trial court ruled, the statement to Deputy Stratford was
not the product of custodial interrogation.
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that "the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination." 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966). The
Miranda Court defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her]
freedom of action in any significant way." IcL
In Rhode Island v. Innis, the Supreme Court further clarified the meaning of
"interrogation" as "either express questioning or its functional equivalent." 446 U.S. 291,
300-01,100 S.Ct. 1682,1689-90. In other words, "the term 'interrogation* under Miranda
refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the
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police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id
Both the Miranda and Innis decisions recognized that not "all statements obtained by
the police after a person has been taken into custody are to be considered the product of
interrogation;' Innis. 446 U.S. at 300,100 S.Ct. at 1689; Miranda. 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct.
at 1630. Rather, "'[interrogation,' as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect
a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself." Innis, 446 U.S.
at 300, 100 S.Ct. at 1689. Moreover, "fvjolunteered statements of any kind are not barred
by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by [the Miranda decision]."
Id (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630) (emphasis added).
Thus, for a statement made without Miranda warnings to be inadmissible, it must "be
established that a suspect's incriminating response was the product o/words or actions on
the part of the police that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response." Innis, 446 U.S. at 303, 100 S.Ct. at 1691 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, statements that are not the product of interrogation, but which are volunteered
are admissible. See, e.g.. State v. Dutchie, 969 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1998) (detective's
request for background information not interrogation, therefore defendant's voluntary and
spontaneous statements admissible); State v. Hales. 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993)
(telling defendant that he was under arrest was not interrogation, therefore his spontaneous,
voluntary utterance was not product of interrogation).
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Plainly, an accused's volunteered statements cannot be the product of interrogation
in the absence of interrogation or its functional equivalent. For example, a defendant's
unsolicited incriminating chatter to police transporting him to jail are not the product of
interrogation where officers did not question defendant, but merely agreed with his
statements. Rg,, State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534, (Utah App. 1997) (finding defendant's
statements voluntary and spontaneous where transporting police office did not "interrogate"
defendant); see also Dutchie, 969 P.2d at 426 (defendant's statements not product of
interrogation where police merely asked for background information and stated words
normally attendant to arrest); Hales, 860 P.2d at 972 (announcing that defendant was under
arrest was not interrogation, therefore defendant's statements not product of interrogation);
McGowan v. Miller. 109 F.3d 1168, 1175 (7th Cir. 1997) (where defendant initiated
conversation with police, his statements were volunteered and not product of interrogation).
The fact that a statement is made during a custodial interrogation, however, does not
necessarily mean that the statement results from or is the product of the interrogation. The
Eleventh Circuit held that a statement during custodial interrogation may nevertheless be
admissible under Miranda if the statement was spontaneous and was not responsive to the
question asked. United States v. Castro. 723 F.2d 1527, 1530-31 (11th Cir. 1984). In that
case, a customs officer investigating possible drug activity held the defendant at gun point
and, without giving Miranda warnings, asked, "What in the world is going on here?" The
defendant responded, "You want money? We got money." Id. at 1529. The court held that
30

the officer's question in that case amounted u* a custodial interrogation. LI at 1530. The
court determined that defendant's response was not barred by Miranda, however, because it
was "spontaneously volunteered and totally unresponsive to the officer's question."14 Id. at
1530. See also United States v. Thomas, 961 F. Supp. 43,45-46 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding
that even if question asked of defendant were in form of custodial interrogation, defendant's
response was still admissible under Miranda because it was not responsive to the question);
State v. Mitchell. 482 N.W.2d 364,687-88 (Wis. 1988) (even though defendant was subject
to custodial interrogation, his conduct of walking to car and attempting to conceal a bag of
cocaine, while testimonial in nature, was non-responsive to officer's question and therefore
admissible).
Here, the State conceded below, and the trial court found, that defendant was in
custody during the time he was in the hospital (R. 1205; 505). There is no dispute that
defendant received no Miranda warnings before any of his statements to any of the officers.
The only question before this Court is whether defendant's statement to Deputy Stratford was
the product of interrogation. As explained below, it was not, first because the deputy's sole
14

The Castro decision rested in part on the proposition that "[a]n attempt to commit
another crime designed to interfere with a police officer's carrying out of his duties
simply must be beyond the Intent of Miranda." Id. at 1530-31. The primary thrust of the
opinion, however, is that the defendant's statement was "not responsive to any
interrogation." Id. at 1532. The court concluded that suppression of this "unresponsive
statement would be in direct conflict with the very fountainhead of Miranda," which
expressly held that "'[voluntary statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth
Amendment nor has their admissibility been affected by the Miranda decision or its
progeny.'" LI at 1532 (quoting Miranda. 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1629).
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question to defendant did not constitute interrogation, and second because even if defendant
was subject to custodial interrogation, his statement was not in response to, and therefore not
the product of, any interrogation.
1. The deputy's question was not interrogation.
It is undisputed that upon arriving at the hospital, Deputy Stratford asked defendant
only one question, "Do you remember the accident?" (R. 238,1133,1135,1258). The trial
court correctly concluded that this question did not constitute interrogation because it was
not "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Innis, 446 U.S. at 303,100 S.Ct.
at 1691.
The likelihood that a question will elicit an incriminating response is determined from
all the circumstances. Lavton City v. Aragon, 813 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah App. 1991).
"Although the subjective intent of police in asking the question is relevant, the main focus
is on whether the suspect is likely to incriminate himself or herself in response." kL
(citations omitted).
Although Deputy Stratford admitted that he was interested in obtaining defendant's
side of the story (R. 1124, 1132-33), his question was not one that called for, or even
anticipated, an incriminating response. It simply asked for a "yes" or "no." Significantly,
the question did not call for the responses that defendant ultimately gave, i.e., that he knew
the truck was stolen before he ran from police, that he did not know a gun in the truck was
loaded, and that he knew nothing about an earlier burglary committed by some of his
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passengers. The question asked whether defendant remembered the accident. On its face,
it did not seek to elicit any information regarding any of the crimes that defendant eventually
volunteered.
Moreover, in the context of this case, the question may have been a preliminary
question calculated not just to obtain defendant's side of the story, but also tofirstascertain
defendant's mental processes. Deputy Stratford testified that he had tried to talk to defendant
earlier in the day, but that defendant had been "nonrespondent" (R. 1133). It is reasonable
under these circumstances to conclude that before specifically questioning defendant about
the accident, Deputy Stratford may havefirstwanted to determine whether defendant had the
capacity to answer any questions. Preliminary questions such as this one that merely seek
background information or to assess whether the subject is in a condition to be questioned
are not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. See Dutchie, 969 P.2d at 426-27
(officer's questions regarding suspects name, address, age, height, weight, education,
employment, personal goals, and medications were not likely to elicit incriminating
responses, but were mere requests for background information that could assist the officer
in assessing the suspect's capacity to be questioned and to validly waive Miranda rights).15

15

It is entirely possible that if defendant had simply replied that he did remember
the accident that Deputy Stratford would have then given him Miranda warnings before
asking any other questions. Unfortunately, the record is silent as to this point.
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Because Deputy Stratford's single question was not reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response, it was not interrogation for purposes of Miranda. The trial court
therefore correctly refused to suppress the statement.16
2. Defendant's statement was non-responsive to the deputy's question.
Even assuming that Deputy Stratford's question did amount to interrogation,
defendant's statement was not the product of that interrogation. Rather, as the trial court
found, defendant's statement was not responsive to the question asked, but was
"spontaneously volunteered" (R. 498, 506).
The trial court's finding on this point was not clearly erroneous, but was fully
supported by the evidence. The uncontroverted facts before the trial court were that
defendant did not immediately respond to Deputy Stratford's question (R. 1134-35). Instead,
as soon as the question was asked, the attention of defendant, Stratford, and Hunter were all
distracted by a newscast about the accident (R. 1134-25). For three to four minutes the three
men watched the newscast, saying nothing to each other (R. 1134-35). Then, without any
prompting from the deputies, defendant simply volunteered that he knew the truck was stolen
when he fled, that he did not know the gun was loaded, and that he knew nothing about an
16

Defendant suggests in his brief that the newscast, in conjunction with Deputy
Stratford's question, constituted interrogation. Br. Aplt. 21, 23. Defendant cites to no
authority for this novel proposition. Interrogation requires some action on the part of
police. The newscast simply did not constitute police action let alone questioning or its
functional equivalent that was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
defendant. Neither is there anything in the record to suggest that Deputy Stratford used
the newscast in any way.
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earlier burglary (R. 1133-35). None of these statements answered the original question and
all were totally non-responsive to the question. Indeed, under the peculiar circumstances of
this case, it appears that the statements were made in response to the newscast, and not to
Deputy Stratford's question four minutes earlier.
Defendant nevertheless argues that the trial court's finding that defendant's statements
were spontaneous and not in response to the deputy's question was clearly erroneous or
against the great weight of the evidence. Br. Aplt. 17-19. In making this claim, defendant
points to Deputy Stratford's testimony on cross-examination that seemingly contradicts his
direct testimony that defendant's statement was spontaneous.17 Br. Aplt. 18. Defendant
contends that the trial court "provided no persuasive reason why Deputy Stratford's
conflicting testimony should be resolved in favor of a finding of spontaneity," and argues
that the trial court should have resolved the conflict in favor of defendant. Br. Aplt. 19.

1

Specifically, defendant relies on the following colloquy:
Q [by defense counsel]: And you asked him follow-up questions
about what he remembered about the accident. Correct?
A: I asked him if he remembered the accident so I could find out his side of
the story, yeah.
Q: And my next question is, he responded to that. Correct?
A: Yes, uh-huh.
Q: And you asked follow-up questions to try and get some more details
from him, did you not?
A: I don't recall if asked any other follow-up questions or not. The
information that he gave me gave me brief sketch of his side of the story. I
don't know if anything - 1 tried to clarify anything in that. I can't recall.
(R. 1133-34).
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Defendant's argument erroneously assumes that Deputy Stratford's testimony was
inherently contradictory and that this was the only evidence upon which the trial court could
find that defendant's statements were voluntary and non-responsive to any questions. A
review of Deputy Stratford's entire testimony demonstrates that his testimony was not
internally contradictory. Stratford consistently testified that he only asked defendant whether
he remembered the accident and that defendant said nothing for three to four minutes while
they all watched the newscast (R. 1133-35).
While Stratford may have wavered on his characterization of defendant's statement
as being either "spontaneous" or "responsive," the trial court was not bound by either
characterization. That determination was to be made by the trial court based on the totality
of the circumstances. The time lapse between the deputy's question and defendant's
response, the intervening newscast, as well as the non-responsiveness of defendant's answer
were all factors that supported the trial court's ultimate finding that defendant's statements
were not in response to Deputy Stratford's question, but were spontaneous statements.
Because the trial court reasonably concluded that defendant's statement to Deputy
Stratford was not the product of custodial interrogation, the statements were admissible.18
18

Defendant alternatively argues that even if the trial court correctly found that his
statement was not spontaneous, "the State still failed to show that [his] statement was
sufficiently attenuated from the prior illegal questioning." Br. Aplt. 19. Defendant has
waived this argument because he did not make it below. See State v. Schweitzer, 943
P.2d 649, 654 n. 3 (Utah App. 1997) (declining to review issue raised for first time on
appeal); State v. Beltran-Felix. 922 P.2d 30, 33 (Utah App. 1996) (declining to review
argument not raised below).
(continued . . . . )
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm defendant's
convictions for automobile homicide and his guilty plea for receiving or transferring a stolen
vehicle.
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( . . . continued).
In any event, a separate attenuation analysis is unnecessary here. Defendant
argues that his statements to Deputy Stratford were obtained "by direct exploitation of the
illegal questioning" because "there was a minimal passage of time [between the question
and answer], no change in location, and no change in identity of the interrogator." Br.
Aplt. 21. Defendant's attenuation argument is really just another way of saying that his
incriminating statement was the product of custodial interrogation from Deputy Stratford
without the benefit of Miranda warnings. The State agrees that the time between the
question and answer and whether there were any intervening events are factors to be
considered in determining whether defendant's statement was the product of custodial
interrogation. However, for the reasons already stated, defendant's statements were not
the product of custodial interrogation: there was only one question, there were three to
four minutes between the question and the answer, the newscast was an intervening event
between the question and answer, and the statement was not responsive to the question
asked.
To the extent that defendant's attenuation argument suggests that his statement
was the product of coercive police tactics, that claim is wholly without merit. There is no
evidence that police brought any pressure to bear on defendant at any time. Deputy
Stratford asked only one question and instead of demanding an immediate answer, turned
to watch a newscast. Asking one non-threatening, non-accusatory question in a hospital
setting simply does not rise to the level of coercion.
37

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this^Cday of (pd^c/
of the foregoing Appellee's Brief were delivered to:
Robert K. Heineman
Attorney for Appellant Riggs
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
£ * ^ C ,^

38

1999

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
Statutes

76-5-207. Automobile homicide.
(1) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree felony, if
the actor operates a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of
.08% or greater by weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree that
renders the actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and causes the
death of another by operating the vehicle in a negligent manner.
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "negligent" means simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that reasonable and
prudent persons exercise under like or similar circumstances.
(2) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second degree felony, if
the actor operates a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of
.08% or greater by weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree that
renders the actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and causes the
death of another by operating the motor vehicle in a criminally negligent
manner.
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "criminally negligent" means
criminal negligence as defined by Subsection 76-2-103(4).
(3) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided by Section
41-6-44.3 and the provisions for the admissibility of chemical test results as
provided by Section 41-6-44.5 apply to determination and proof of blood alcohol
content under this section.
(4) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood is based upon grams of alcohol
per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood.
(5) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is on or has
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense to any charge of
violating this section.
(6) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content
is admissible except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution.
(7) For purposes of this section, "motor vehicle" means any self-propelled
vehicle and includes any automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train, engine,
watercraft, or aircraft.

76-2-103- Definitions of intentionally, or with intent or
willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge";
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal negligence or criminally negligent."
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviationfromthe
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewedfromthe actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when
he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross
deviationfromthe standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise
in all the circumstances as viewedfromthe actor's standpoint.

4Ma-1316. Receiving or transferring stolen motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer — Penalty.
It is a second degree felony for a person:
(1) with intent to procure or pass title to a motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer that he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or
unlawfully taken to receive or transfer possession of the motor vehicle,
trailer, or semitrailer from or to another; or
(2) to have in his possession any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer
that he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully
taken if he is not a peace officer engaged at the time in the performance of
his duty.

ADDENDUM B
Trial Court's Written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
on Motion to Suppress

r

HirH InrlidalOistrict

JUN 2J1996
Deoutv Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 961900273

-vsDANIEL K. RIGGS,

JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
two motions of defendant, Daniel K. Riggs: (1) "Motion to Suppress
Blood Draw Evidence" and

(2) "Motion to Suppress Defendant's

Statements".
On April 26, 1996, an evidentiary hearing on the two motions
was held before the Court at which time the defendant was present
and represented by counsel Lisa J. Remal and Susanne Gustin-Furgis,
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association.

The State of Utah was

represented by Kenneth R. Updegrove, Deputy District Attorney.

At

the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the Court ordered
additional briefing and scheduled oral argument by the parties on
May 10, 1996.
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FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

At the May 10 oral argument/ the defendant was again present
and represented by Ms. Remal and Ms. Gustin-Furgis. Additionally,
Ralph Dellapiana, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, also argued
in behalf

of the defendant.

represented by Mr. Updegrove.

The State

of Utah was

again

At the conclusion of the oral

argument, the Court ruled from the bench on all issues and ordered
Mr. Updegrove to prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law.1

thereafter, defendant's counsel received the proposedfindingsof fact and conclusions of law
and submitted written objections to them. At a hearing on June 4, 1996, attended by the defendant
and counsel for both parties, the Court ruled on the objections and proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law. A second draft of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law was then
prepared. The Court has now carefully reviewed the second draft, re-read the transcript of the
suppression hearing, made numerous changes to the second draft and hereby renders these findings
of fact and conclusions of law.
Because of limitations of time and resources, the Court has not specified the various citations
to the suppression hearing transcript to which thefindingscorrespond. Indeed, evidence regarding
certain events such as, for example, the probable cause evidence known by a particular officer at a
particular time, may be addressed at several different places throughout the transcript according to
what the officer himself said and also to what other officers said they told to the officer.
Further, specificfindingsmay vary somewhat from the exact language used by a witness at
one location in the transcript. Where this occurs, the variation resultsfromthe Court's review of all
of the evidence concerning the subject matter addressed, the weight of the evidence, the inferences
that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, if appropriate, and the reasonable reconciliation of
conflicts in the evidence, if appropriate. Thus, consideration of all of the evidence has been given in
rendering these findings of fact.

M0481

STATE V. RIGGS

PAGE THREE

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS
A.

Blood Draw Test Results

Turning first to the defendant's claims regarding the blood
draw evidence, he seeks to suppress two different blood alcohol
test results of blood drawn from him: (1) the "state-analyzed"
blood drawn by the State's phlebotomist, Bryan Davis ("Mr. Davis")/
and analyzed by the State's toxicologist, Bruce Beck ("Mr. Beck");
and (2) the "hospital-analyzed" blood drawn by Mr. Davis at the
request of Pioneer Hospital and analyzed by the Pioneer Valley
Hospital Laboratory.
As to the state-analyzed blood, the defendant claims the blood
alcohol results of the defendant's blood samples are inadmissible
because (1) the defendant was not under arrest and did not give his
consent to his blood being drawn, the blood draw constitutes an
unconstitutional search under both the United States Constitution
and the Constitution of the State of Utah; (2) the chain of custody
of the state-analyzed blood was defective; (3) the manner in which
the state-analyzed blood was stored by Mr. Davis and stored and
tested by Mr. Beck; and (4) only the law enforcement officer who
was present at the hospital with the defendant could have ordered
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the defendant's blood to be drawn, and he did not have probable
cause to do so.2
As to the hospital-analyzed blood, the defendant claims the
blood alcohol results are inadmissible because (1) the blood draw
constitutes
constitute

an unconstitutional
privileged

search; and

information under

the

(2) the

results

physician-patient

provisions of Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
B.

Defendant's Alleged Statements

Defendant has also moved to suppress incriminating statements
he allegedly made to different law enforcement officers on several
different occasions on the grounds that (1) these statements were
taken

in

violation

of

his

rights

under

the

United

States

Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Utah; and (2)
because of the injuries he received in the automobile collision and
resulting medical treatment, any such statements made by him were
made neither knowingly nor voluntarily.
C.

Burden of Proof

It is undisputed that the State of Utah has the burden of
proof in this proceedings.

2

The Court has by its Memorandum Decision dated May 17, 1996, resolved this issue.
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The Court, having considered the weight ^'
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a

red

Ford

pickup

truck

("pickup7') approach him from the rear at a high rate of speed.
6.

The pickup stopped at the red light in the lane next to

Trooper Bairett.
7.

Trooper Bairett looked at the driver of the pickup from

a distance of approximately eight to ten feet.
8.

The lighting was sufficient for Trooper Bairett to see

the features of the driver of the pickup.
9.

When the light turned green, the pickup proceeded west

across Redwood Road at approximately 25 miles per hour.
1.0. The speed limit on 5400 South at that location is 45
miles per hour.
11.

Trooper Bairett slowed his patrol vehicle so that the

driver of the pickup was forced to proceed ahead of Trooper
Bairett.
12.

Trooper Bairett was able to observe that the registration

on the pickup's rear license plate had expired.
13.

Trooper Bairett read the license plate number to Dispatch

and was subsequently informed that the plate was not registered to
the pickup.
14.

Trooper Bairett decided to stop the pickup.
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Trooper Bairett proceeded northbound after the pickup;

however, even at a speed of approximately 75 miles per hour,
Trooper Bairett was unable to narrow substantially the distance
between him and the pickup.
25.

Trooper Bairett observed that the traffic control signal

ahead of the pickup at the intersection of 5400 South and 2200 West
was red.
26.

Based upon his experience that most vehicles slow at red

lights and because he observed the pickup's brake lights come on
briefly, Trooper Bairett thought the pickup would stop at the red
light.
27.

However, the pickup did not stop; instead, it entered the

intersection when the light facing it was red.
28.

As the pickup entered the intersection, Trooper Bairett

was located approximately 150 yards to the south on 2200 West.
29.

As the pickup entered the intersection northbound, a

Saturn passenger vehicle entered the intersection westbound at a
speed of approximately 40 miles per hour.
30.

The pickup and Saturn collided near the middle of the

intersection.
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Trooper Bairett noticed the defendant had a head injury

which was bleeding, but not profusely.
41.

To Trooper Bairett, the defendant appeared to be in

shock.
42.

The

defendant mumbled,

answered

questions

and made

statements.
43.
scene,

Later, while the defendant was still at the collision
it

appeared

to

Trooper

Bairett

that

the

defendant's

condition improved.
44.

Trooper Bairett detected an odor of an alcoholic beverage

coming from the defendant.
45.

Trooper Bairett acknowledged that a head injury can cause

someone to appear intoxicated and yet not be; however, because of
the defendant's appearance and the sound of his voice, Trooper
Bairett believed the defendant, notwithstanding his head injury,
was, in fact, intoxicated.
46.

Trooper Bairett told the defendant that help was on the

way and to remain still.
47.

Trooper Bairett proceeded to the greenhouse to attempt to

assess the injuries of those in the Saturn.
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Trooper Bairett also found =>" ^d;,,....,_, * who 1 . been
fr

o m the pi ckup on the groi ind ,
^rooper Bairett returned tc I In MM I Mnldiil >il III

|»i n hip.

J'rooper Bairett asked the defendant who was driving the
IJ| l "• I* ? •
^rooper Bairett asked the defendant w h y the defendant had
i \ r i v i n i,"i,

:i i response, the d e f e n d a n t told T r o o p e r B a i r e t t thu

^

was d ^ ' v ^ g because "everybody else was too drunk to drive."
Trooper Bairet
Miranda rights prirr to questioning him,,
" .onal
help "for Dlood draw purposes as wel. i,

r a a i c cuncioi d: the

scei le."
55,
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Trooper Bairett believed there was the potential for some

of those involved

in the collision to die because of their

injuries.
59.

Trooper Bairett determined to have blood drawn from the

defendant.
60.

Trooper Bairett did not leave the collision scene because

of his duties.
61.
Sheriff's

Trooper Bairett spoke to "one or more" Salt Lake County
deputies

("deputies") after

they

responded

to the

collision scene.
62.
L. Craig

In particular. Trooper Bairett spoke with Sergeant Delwin
("Sergeant Craig") and to Deputy Lawrence Stratford

("Deputy Stratford").
63.

Trooper Bairett described to Deputy Stratford what he had

observed and his concerns.
64.

Trooper Bairett did not arrest the defendant at the

collision scene.
SERGEANT DELWIN L. CRAIG
65.

On November

14, 1995, at approximately

3:40 a.m.,

Sergeant Craig responded to the collision scene.
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Sergeant Craig got "very close" to the defendant and

observed that the defendant was "shaken up" and had bloodshot eyes.
76.

When he was "probably within one foot of the defendant,"

Sergeant Craig noticed the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming
from the defendant.
77.

Sergeant Craig asked Deputy Lonnie Wilson to remain with

the defendant.
78.

Sergeant Craig called East Patrol and requested the

assistance of a deputy to witness the defendant's blood draw.
79.
evidence

Sergeant Craig believed he had enough information and
to

justify

the

defendant's

blood

being

drawn.

Specifically, the information he had included that he
a.

saw the pickup on its roof;

b.

observed the Saturn lodged in the side of the
greenhouse;

c.

observed the beer cans strewn about;

d.

knew that Trooper Bairett had tried to stop the
pickup and that the pickup "took off on [Trooper
Bairett]" and

then collided with the Saturn in the

intersection;
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knew from, Trooper Bairett that fhp d__-. .
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("Deputy Roberts''), arrived at the collision scene to carry out
that responsibility.
DEPUTY CRAIG DON ROBERTS
84.

When Deputy Roberts arrived, the defendant was secured

onto a stretcher by straps and was waiting to be loaded into an
ambulance.
85.

Deputy Roberts was present at the collision scene very

briefly ("a minute or two," "just about a minute").
86.

While he was at the scene, Deputy Roberts observed

several patrol vehicles, ambulances and paramedics.
87.

Deputy Roberts observed the pickup and Saturn which had

been involved in the collision.
88.

Deputy Roberts observed the debris in the immediate area.

89.

The debris included beer cans and vehicle parts.

90.

Deputy Roberts spoke with an officer on the scene, Deputy

Jason Jones, who explained to Deputy Roberts that the driver of the
pickup had "blown the intersection and hit the red car sending it
into the building.

And that the person [Roberts] was supposed to

go watch, this Daniel Riggs, was the one that was driving the
truck."
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Sergeant Craig directed Deputy Roberts to go to Pioneer

Valley Hospital and "witness" the blood draw on the defendant.
92.

Deputy

Roberts

then

followed

the

ambulance

to the

hospital.
93.

Prior to November 14, 1995, Deputy Roberts had worked in

law enforcement for the Midvale City Police Department for almost
four years.
94.

Deputy Roberts has been with the Salt Lake County

Sheriff's office for just over a year.
95.

At the time of the collision, Deputy Roberts had training

in the apprehension of intoxicated drivers through POST, understood
how to use the intoxalyzer and was experienced in performing field
sobriety tests.
96.

Deputy Roberts has made "[p]robably a couple hundred [DUI

arrests] in the last five years."
DEPUTY LAWRENCE STRATFORD
97.
November

Deputy Stratford arrived at the collision scene on
14, 1995, shortly after the ambulance

carrying the

defendant left for the hospital.
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Detective Stratford was responsible

for heading the

collision investigation team and "took charge" of the investigation
when he arrived at the scene.
99.

Deputy Stratford was briefed at the scene by Trooper

Bairett, Sergeant Craig and other law enforcement officers.
100. Trooper Bairett described his observations and concerns
to Deputy Stratford.
101. Based on his briefing with Trooper Bairett, Sergeant
Craig and other law enforcement officers, Deputy Stratford was
aware of considerable evidence regarding the likely cause of the
collision and the possible use of alcoholic beverages by the
defendant.
102. Deputy Stratford observed beer cans in the collision
debris.
103. Deputy Stratford observed open beer cans within the cab
of the pickup.
104. Although not "100 percent" certain, after his briefing
with the law enforcement officers, Deputy Stratford had a "strong
idea" that the defendant was the driver of the pickup.
105. According to Sergeant Craig, Deputy Stratford ordered the
blood draw on the defendant.
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Sergeant

Craig

to

send

deputies to witness blood draws on the defendant, Michael Lambrou,
Lonnie James, and Kevin Smithson.
107. Michael Lambrou and Lonnie James had been in the Saturn/
Kevin Smithson had been in the pickup.
108. As of November 14, 1995, Deputy Stratford was a law
enforcement officer with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office.
109. As of November 14, 1995, Deputy Stratford had worked for
the Salt Lake County Sheriff for approximately 12 years.
110. As of November 14, 1995, Deputy Stratford was assigned to
the Traffic Division as an investigator.
THE DEFENDANT'S BLOOD DRAW
111. Subsequent to the arrival of Deputy Roberts at the
hospital, he and the state's phlebotomist, Bryan Davis

("Mr.

Davis"), together went into the emergency room where the defendant
lay.
112. When

Deputy

Roberts

and

Bryan

Davis

entered

the

defendant's emergency room, the straps which had secured the
defendant to the stretcher had been removed and the defendant had
been moved from the stretcher to a hospital bed.
113. The defendant was awake and appeared to be coherent.
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114. Deputy Roberts told the defendant they "were there to do
a blood draw."
115. Deputy Roberts did not tell the defendant the blood was
for police purposes.
116. In response to Deputy Roberts' statement, the defendant
voiced no objection.
117. The defendant did not indicate that Deputy Roberts and
Mr. Davis could proceed with the blood draw.
118. No search warrant authorizing the blood draw was obtained
prior to the drawing of the defendant's blood.
119. Deputy Roberts observed that the defendant had a head
wound and that there was blood on his head.
120. From a distance of approximately one foot, Deputy Roberts
smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage on the defendant's
breath; however, he did not notice any slurring of speech by the
defendant.
121. Throughout the time Deputy Roberts observed the defendant
at the hospital, the defendant was "pretty well doing everything
that the nurses asked him to do."
122. As time passed between 4:46

a.m.

and 6:30

a.m. on

November 14, 1995, to Deputy Roberts "[it] seemed that [the
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defendant] got better and was more alert and was more able to move
around and do the things that [the nurses] asked him to do."
123. Deputy Roberts was aware that fatalities were involved in
the collision.
124. Deputy Roberts was aware that blood draws were also being
performed on other individuals involved in the collision.
125. Deputy Roberts did not arrest the defendant at Pioneer
Valley Hospital.
CHAIN OF CUSTODY AND STORAGE OF THE STATE-ANALYZED BLOOD
126. Bryan Davis is a phlebotomist on contract with law
enforcement agencies throughout Salt Lake County to draw blood from
suspects at the request of law enforcement officers.
127. Mr. Davis is familiar with the provisions of Section 416-44 Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended.
128. On

November

14, 1995, Mr

Davis

was

qualified

and

authorized by the Utah State Health Department pursuant to Utah law
to perform blood draws in behalf of the State on DUI suspects and
he had been so qualified and authorized for approximately 11 years.
129. During the last approximately 12 years, Mr. Davis has
performed over 9,000 evidentiary draws.
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130. Mr. Davis testified that he consistently follows standard
procedures in the performance/ handling and storage of evidentiary
blood draws.
131. In this case, Mr. Davis followed his standard, consistent
procedures

in

the performance, handling

and

storage

of

the

defendant's blood draw evidence.
132. The procedures followed by Mr. Davis in this and his
other evidentiary blood draws are that he
a.

obtains the blood;

b.

encloses the blood in glass vacutainer tubes;

c.

individually marks the tubes with the defendant's
name, Mr. Davis' initials, the date of the blood
draw and the time of the blood draw;

d.

places the tubes into an envelope which contains
virtually the same information, along with some
information regarding the police agency's case and
deputies or officers involved in the accident;

e.

seals the envelope by a gum seal and tapes over the
seal;

f.

has the officer witnessing the seal sign on the
back of the envelope; and
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maintains the envelope containing the tubes in his
possession or under secure conditions until he can
deliver it to the State forensic toxicologist.

133. The

tubes

into

which

the

blood

is

drawn

contain

preservative, or anticoagulant, agents: one tube contains sodium
fluoride and the second contains potassium oxalate.
134. On the morning on November 14, 1995, Mr. Davis went to
Pioneer Valley Hospital to draw the defendant's blood.
135. Mr. Davis did, in fact, draw the defendant's blood.
136. Mr. Davis prepared the defendant's arm for the blood draw
by cleansing the area with a soap and water solution.
137. Mr.

Davis

stated

it

was

"probable"

he

moved

the

defendant's arm out to draw the blood and then drew the blood.
138. It is undisputed that Mr. Davis performed the blood draw
in a reasonable and safe manner.
139. It took Mr. Davis approximately three minutes to complete
the blood draw.
140. As the blood was being drawn, the defendant neither
withdrew his arm nor voiced an objection to the procedure.
141. At the same time Mr. Davis drew the defendant's blood for
state-analysis, either Mr. Davis or a nurse from Pioneer Hospital
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drew three additional tubes of the defendant's blood for his
medical treatment.
142. Thus, a combined total of five tubes of blood were drawn
from the defendant: two for state-analysis and three for hospitalanalysis.
143. The tubes of blood drawn for the State were marked with
the defendant's name, the date and time and Mr. Davis1 initials.
144. Mr. Davis then sealed the tubes of blood in an envelope
and taped over the seal.
145. Deputy Roberts signed the back of the envelope over the
taped seal.
14 6. After leaving the hospital, Mr. Davis placed the envelope
containing the vials of blood drawn from the defendant in a
container in his locked motor vehicle.
147. The container into which Mr. Davis placed the envelope is
a non-refrigerated cooler which Mr. Davis had positioned in his
vehicle for the purpose of holding blood draw evidence.
148. The cooler is not locked.
149. Mr. Davis then drove to LDS Hospital, Cottonwood Hospital
and the University of Utah Medical Center to perform similar blood
draws.
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150. Mr. Davis locked his vehicle when he exited.
151. The

container

in

the vehicle

did

not

need

to be

refrigerated because the tubes into which the blood had been drawn
contained preservatives which temporarily protect the blood against
deterioration.
152. According to Mr. Davis, blood protected by preservatives
is commonly sent by mail throughout the country in unrefrigerated
packages.
153. Dennis Crouch, the defendant's forensic toxicologist
expert witness

("Mr.

Crouch"), agreed that blood protected by

preservatives is often sent by mail throughout the country in
unrefrigerated packages.
154. The fact the defendant's blood was temporarily placed in
the unrefrigerated cooler did not affect the accuracy of the blood
alcohol content results.
155. When he had performed all of the blood draws that
morning, Mr. Davis took the envelope containing the tubes of
defendant's blood, together with similar envelopes containing blood
samples from the other blood draws performed that morning to his
home where he placed them in a specifically-designated bottom
drawer in his refrigerator.
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156. Mr. Davis1 refrigerator and the drawer in which Mr. Davis
stores the blood sample envelopes are not locked.
157. Mr.

Davis1

wife

and

children

have

access

to

the

refrigerator drawer; however, Mr. Davis has instructed all of his
family members never to open the drawer containing the envelopes.
158. No food is kept in the designated drawer.
159. Subsequently, Mr. Davis transferred the envelope holding
the defendant's blood samples to the State Laboratory where Mr.
Beck took custody of the blood samples.
160. Mr. Davis testified, based on his various inspections of
the envelope which held the defendant's blood sample, that at no
time during which he had custody of the defendant's blood samples
was there any indication whatsoever that the seal of the envelope
had been tampered with or come off, that either of the tubes had
broken or leaked, that the identifying labels on the packages had
shifted or come off, and that when he transferred the envelope to
Mr. Beck the envelope was in the exact same condition it was when
the envelope was sealed at Pioneer Valley Hospital.
161. No evidence was presented to suggest that while the blood
was in the custody of Mr. Davis that the envelope containing the
sealed tubes of the defendant's blood had been tampered with.
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162. No evidence was presented to suggest any bad faith on the
part of the State in Mr. Davis' handling of the blood sample taken
from the defendant.
TESTING OF THE STATE-ANALYZED BLOOD
163. Mr. Beck personally received from Mr. Davis the sealed
envelope containing the two tubes of defendant's blood on November
16, 1995, at 3 p.m.
164. Mr. Beck is employed by the Utah State Division of
Laboratories as a toxicologist.
165. Mr. Beck has a Bachelor of Science degree in chemistry,
a Bachelor of Science degree in pharmacy and approximately 23 years
of on-the-job experience.
166. Mr.

Beck

is

a member

of

the

Society

of

Forensic

Toxicologists and a Diplomate of the American Board of Forensics
Toxicology.
167. The parties stipulated that Mr. Beck is an expert for the
purposes of the suppression hearing.
168. Upon receipt of the defendant's blood samples, Mr. Beck
prepared the samples for testing and then placed the samples in the
refrigerator in the evidence room of the State Laboratory.
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169. The evidence room is not open to the public and is locked
unless staff are present in the room.
170. Later in the afternoon that day at 4:55 p.m., Mr. Beck
tested the defendant's blood samples for the presence of ethanol,
which is normal drinking alcohol.
171. Mr.

Beck

used

a

testing

device

known

as

a

gas

chromatograph ("GC") to analyze the defendant's blood for ethanol.
172. The GC equipment used by Mr. Beck

to analyze the

defendant's blood is considered to be the standard machine used by
toxicologists to determine the presence of ethanol in blood.
173. Quality controls are used in the GC testing process to
ensure that the equipment is working properly.
174. Quality controls are used before, during and following
the testing of blood samples.
175. The quality controls used before, during and after the GC
testing of the defendant's blood indicated that the GC equipment
was functioning within acceptable tolerances.
17 6. The

GC

equipment

at

the

State

Laboratory

has

50

carousels, which enables the analysis of multiple blood samples on
one run.
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177. The results of the GC analysis of each blood sample
tested correspond to each numbered carousel in which a blood sample
is placed.
178. Two tests were performed on each of defendant's blood
samples.
179. The results of the analysis of the defendant's blood
indicated 0.13 grams of ethanol per 100 milliliters of

blood.

CHAIN OF CUSTODY AND TESTING OF THE HOSPITAL-ANALYZED BLOOD
180. On November 14, 1995, Cindy Sadler ("Nurse Sadler") was
employed as a registered nurse by Pioneer Valley Hospital and was
involved in the blood draw of the defendant.
181. As of November 14, 1995, Nurse Sadler had an Associate
Degree from Weber State College.
182. Nurse

Sadler has worked as a registered nurse for

eighteen years.
183. Nurse Sadler is not aware of a specific policy at Pioneer
Valley

Hospital

regarding

the analysis of alcohol

in people

involved in accidents; however, Nurse Sadler is aware that the
hospital does ask for analysis of alcohol in the blood of people
involved in accidents.
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184. After Mr. Davis drew two tubes of blood for the State,
either he or Nurse Sadler drew three more tubes for use by the
hospital.
185. Nurse Sadler received the hospital's three tubes of
defendant's blood.
186. Nurse

Sadler

then

copied

the

defendant's

name

and

identifying information from his hospital armband onto labels
which, in turn, she placed on each of the three blood tubes.
187. Nurse Sadler also placed her initials, "CS," on each of
the three tubes.
188. Nurse Sadler then sent the three tubes to the Pioneer
Valley Hospital Laboratory for analysis.
189. On November 14, 1995, Stanley R. Hardy ("Mr. Hardy") was
employed as a medical technician in the Pioneer Valley Hospital
Laboratory.
190. Mr. Hardy's education, training and experience qualify
him to perform the analysis of blood to determine the presence of
ethyl alcohol.
191. Mr. Hardy received the three tubes of defendant's blood
and tested it on a Roche Mira machine.
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192. The defendant does not challenge the chain of custody or
the accuracy of the blood testing procedure of the defendant's
hospital-analyzed blood,
193. Mr. Hardy knew the two tubes contained the defendant's
blood because the label on each tube indicating the defendant's
name and hospital armband information matched the information on
the defendant's order slip because the order slip also contained
the defendant's name and identifying hospital armband information.
194. The order slip tells him the test(s) he is to perform on
the blood samples.
195. Mr. Hardy also identified the initials "CS" that had been
placed on the tubes by Nurse Sadler and his own initials, "SH, "
that indicate who performed the test.
196. Mr. Hardy ran the blood test on the defendant's blood.
197. When the defendant's blood was tested, the machine was
working properly and operating "within control."
198. After running the test on the samples, Mr. Hardy received
the test results and confirmed that the test results were from the
blood drawn from the defendant.
199. The results of the analysis of the defendant's blood
indicated 141.7 milligrams of ethanol per deciliter of blood.
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200. Point 7 (.7) milligrams per deciliter is the equivalent
of 0.1417 grams per 100 milliliters.
201. In opposition to the chain of custody, handling and
storage procedures concerning the state-analyzed blood to which Mr.
David and Mr. Beck testified, the defendant called as his expert
witness, Dennis Crouch, a forensic toxicologist at the Center for
Human Toxicology and Research.
202. Mr. Crouch, who has impressive credentials as a forensic
toxicologist, strongly criticized procedures like those followed by
Mr. Davis and Mr. Beck pertaining to the defendant's blood, but
which were put to him hypothetically by defense counsel.
203. Among

other

things, Mr. Crouch

testified

regarding

minimum guidelines jointly recommended by the Society of Forensic
Toxicologists and the Toxicology Section of the American Academy of
Forensic

Sciences

for

laboratories

engaged

in

medical/legal

testing.
204. Also according to Mr. Crouch, based on hypothetical
questions put to him by defense counsel which were designed to
track the procedures followed by Mr. Davis and Mr. Beck, minimum
guidelines concerning chain of custody, security, documentation
were not met, security procedures as posed to him were deficient,
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distinctions between temporary and permanent storage areas of blood
samples should have been made, blood samples should not have been
tested in the same area in which they were stored and blood samples
must be in the tester's line of sight or else be documented to be
stored in a freezer or refrigerated container under lock.
205. However, Mr. Crouch did not have any evidence to suggest
that the tubes containing the defendant's blood had been tampered
with in any way prior to be tested on the GC equipment.
206. Mr. Crouch also agreed that his own lab receives blood
mailed by U.S. mail delivery from other places in Utah that has
been mailed in unrefrigerated containers.
207. Finally, Mr. Crouch did not address the fact that
notwithstanding
testing

of

the

the differences
state-analyzed

in the handling, storage and
blood

(which

Mr.

Crouch

did

criticize) and the hospital-analyzed blood procedures in this case
(which the defendant did not challenge), the state-analyzed results
concluded that the defendant's blood alcohol level on November 14,
1995, was 0.13 grams of ethanol per 100 milliliters of

blood, and

that the hospital-analyzed results found that the defendant's blood
alcohol level on November 14, 1995, was .1417 grams of ethanol per
100 milliliters of blood.

If anything, the hospital-analyzed blood
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test results themselves underscore the accuracy of the stateanalyzed blood test results and thereby affirm the reliability of
the

State's handling, storage and testing procedures

of the

defendant's blood samples.
STATEMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY THE DEFENDANT WHILE
HOSPITALIZED AT THE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER
208. Following some initial treatment and the blood draw on
November 14, 1995, the defendant was transferred from Pioneer
Valley Hospital to the University Medical Center ("UUMC").
209. Fairly soon after the defendant's admission to the UUMC
on November 14, 1995, a UUMC representative contacted Deputy
Stratford to tell him that the hospital had received threats
against the defendant's life and that the hospital was concerned
the defendant's family might remove him from the hospital against
the hospital's wishes.
210. In response, the defendant was provided protection by
security guards, including deputies from the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office, until he was released from the UUMC.
211. The guards were stationed in the defendant's room also to
ensure that the defendant did not leave the hospital.
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DEPUTY BRAD HUNTER
212. From approximately 3:00 p.m. until 5:30 p.m., November
14, 1995, Deputy Brad Hunter ("Deputy Hunter'') was assigned to
guard the defendant in his room at the UUMC.
213. Deputy Hunter did not go to the UUMC to interrogate the
defendant.
214. Deputy Hunter neither interrogated the defendant nor
asked him any specific questions.
215. Deputy Hunter did not advise the defendant of his rights
per Miranda while he was stationed in the defendant's room.
216. When

Deputy

Hunter,

in

uniform,

walked

into

the

defendant's room, the defendant asked him why he was there.
217. Deputy Hunter told the defendant he was there to keep the
defendant at the hospital because the defendant had threatened to
leave.
218. According to Deputy Hunter, the defendant appeared to be
"banged up" and "mentally okay but a little tired."
219. While Deputy Hunter was present the defendant received no
medical attention other than visits "every so often" by a nurse to
"give blood checks."
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defendant

had

a

"general

conversation" for approximately one hour of the two and a half
hours he was in the defendant's room,
221. Deputy Hunter recalled three statements made by the
defendant which he subsequently included in his report.
222. Except as discussed in Findings of Fact Nos. 223 and 226,
there was no discussion concerning the collision or the defendant's
possible involvement in the collision.
223. The first remark spontaneously made by the defendant was
that his (the defendant's) sister had seen him (the defendant) on
the 12 o'clock news.
224. The remark was not made in answer to any question.
225. Deputy Hunter responded to the remark by telling the
defendant he (Deputy Hunter) "didn't see it" and "didn't know much
about what happened."
226. Subsequently, after Deputy Stratford arrived, according
to Deputy Hunter, at one point the defendant also spontaneously
stated that he (the defendant) and some friends had been "driving
a stolen '94...Ford Ranger extended cab," that he had "passed a cop
car.

And when he saw the cop car somebody told him to go, so he

sped up and got approximately 75 miles an hour and went through the
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red light. And that's when the accident happened."

The defendant

also said that if the accident had not happened, "he probably would
have lost the cop."
227. Deputy Hunter neither coerced nor tricked the defendant
into making these statements.
228. Before Deputy Hunter left, he and Deputy Stratford were
together in the defendant's room for approximately five minutes.
229. Deputy

Hunter

knew

Deputy

Stratford

came

to

the

defendant's room to "complete the investigation."
230. Deputy Hunter is and has been a deputy in the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's office for approximately three and a half years.
231. Deputy Hunter was a credible witness.
DEPUTY LAWRENCE STRATFORD
232. Shortly before 6:00 p.m. on November 14, 1995, Deputy
Stratford arrived at the defendant's room at the UUMC.
233. Deputy Stratford went to the UUMC initially "to find out
the problem with the threats" and then decided "that while [he] was
there [he] would try and obtain [the defendant's] side of the story
to find out [the defendant's] version of what happened."
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234. Deputy Stratford did not advise the defendant of his
rights per Miranda while he was present in the defendant's hospital
room.
235. Deputy Hunter was present in the defendant's room when
Deputy Stratford arrived.
236. Deputy Stratford was in uniform when he came to the
defendant's room.
237. When Deputy Stratford arrived, the defendant was talking
to Deputy Hunter.
238. Deputy Stratford asked the defendant "if he remembered
the accident

so that

[Deputy Stratford] could

find out

[the

defendant's] side of the story."
239. When Deputy Stratford arrived, the room's television was
on.

After Deputy Stratford asked the defendant if he remembered

the accident, a television news story came on about the accident.
240. Distracted by the news story, Deputies Stratford and
Hunter turned to listen to it.
241. At

that

time,

according

to

Deputy

Stratford,

the

defendant spontaneously stated that "he knew the car was stolen
before the officer turned his lights on and they decided to run
from him/" "the gun was loaded and that Kevin bought it;" and that
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"he was just taking them home and knew nothing about the burglary
earlier,"
242. The deputies themselves had turned to watch the news
report and were not talking to the defendant when he made these
statements.
243. Deputy

Stratford

neither

coerced

nor

tricked

the

defendant to make any statements.
244. Although Deputy Stratford had asked a question about
whether the defendant could remember the accident so that Deputy
Stratford could fill out his version of events, the statement was
not made in response to Deputy Stratford's question.
245. Indeed, the question was not actually responsive to the
question asked.
24 6. Some of Deputy Stratford's testimony conflicted with some
of his other testimony; however, he was, nevertheless, a credible
witness.
DEPUTY DIRK ROESLER
247. On November

16, 1995, Deputy Dirk Roesler

("Deputy

Roesler") went to the UUMC to guard the defendant.
248. On November 16, the defendant was considered by law
enforcement to be "in custody."
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249. Deputy Roesler did not go to the UUMC to interrogate the
defendant.
250. Deputy Roesler did not interrogate the defendant while he
(Deputy Roesler) was guarding the defendant.
251. Deputy Roesler did not advise the defendant of his
rights per Miranda while he was in the defendant's hospital room.
252. Deputy Roesler indicated that at times the defendant
appeared to be heavily medicated and groggy.
253. Nevertheless, Deputy Roesler and the defendant were able
to converse casually.
254. They did not discuss the accident nor the defendant's
part therein except as follows in Findings 255, 256 and 257.
255. At one point, the defendant spontaneously expressed to
Deputy Roesler that he feared for his (defendant's) safety and
asked if there was anything Deputy Roesler could do to arrange for
confinement outside of the county.
256. In response, Deputy Roesler advised the defendant to
consult

with

his

attorney

concerning

the

conditions

of his

confinement.
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257. Notwithstanding Deputy Roesler's advice, the defendant
continued

to

discuss

the

site

of his

confinement

and

then

volunteered the statement, "I did it, I'm guilty as hell."
258. Deputy Roesler neither coerced nor tricked the defendant
to make any statement.
259. Deputy Roesler has been in law enforcement with the Salt
Lake County Sheriff's office since October 1991.
260. Deputy Roesler was a credible witness.
THE DEFENDANT'S MEDICAL CONDITION AND WHETHER ANY
STATEMENTS BY HIM WERE MADE KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY
261. While at the scene of the collision, the defendant was
partially pinned under the truck and was not free to leave.
262. Trooper Bairett had considerable probable cause evidence
against the defendant to believe the defendant had been driving
under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident.
2 63. Trooper Bairett had considerable evidence to believe that
the defendant caused the accident and that the accident was likely
to cause at least one death.
264. To Trooper Bairett the defendant appeared to be in shock.
264. In view of all of the circumstances, Trooper Bairett
asked the defendant questions which were likely to elicit
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admissions from the defendant without first informing him of his
Miranda rights.
265. While

at

the UUMC,

the defendant

received

medical

treatment for his injuries resulting from the collision.
266. At

times

during

his

hospitalization,

appeared to be tired, groggy and medicated,

the

defendant

it appears that

throughout the day of November 14, his state of alertness improved
and he was "pretty well" able to do what the nurses asked him to
do.
267. At

the

time

the

defendant

allegedly

made

his

incriminating statements to the officers, his medical condition
did not appear to render him unable to make the statements to the
officers knowingly and voluntarily.
268. To the contrary, according to the officers, at each time
the defendant volunteered one of these statements, the defendant
had been engaged in casual conversations.
2 69. Deputies Hunter, Stratford or Roesler neither tricked nor
coerced the defendant into making incriminating statements.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes
the following as a matter of law:
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Trooper Bairett's questions to the defendant at the scene

of the collision at which time the defendant was partially pinned
under the truck and in shock and which were made in the absence of
a

Miranda

warning

went

beyond

the

investigatory

stage

and,

therefor, are suppressed.
2.

The defendant should have been advised of his rights per

Miranda when Trooper Bairett proceeded to interrogate the defendant
about his driving the pickup and why he had run from Trooper
Bairett.
3.

The

defendant,

despite

his

actions

and

lack

of

objections, did not expressly consent to the blood draw by Mr.
Davis.
4.

Because no search warrant authorizing the blood draw had

been obtained prior to the blood draw and because the defendant was
not under arrest, three factors must be satisfied for the blood
draw to pass constitutional muster: first, the draw itself must be
performed in a reasonable and safe manner.
factor,

it

is undisputed

that

With regard to this

the draw was performed

in a

reasonable and safe fashion.
Second, probable cause must be exist for the draw and known to
the officer (s) who directs that a blood draw be conducted.
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Third, exigent circumstances must be present to conduct the
search without a search warrant.
5.

Trooper Bairett, Sergeant Craig and Deputy Stratford

each had probable cause to believe the defendant had operated the
pickup while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage and,
thus, could direct a blood draw.
7.

Trooper Bairett, having probable cause to believe the

defendant had operated the pickup while under the influence of
alcohol, did radio Dispatch and request help, including someone to
help with the defendant's blood draw.
8.

Deputy

Roberts,

the

law

enforcement

official

who

witnessed the blood draw, also had independent probable cause to
order the procedure.
9.

To prevent the dissipation of evidence of ethanol in an

individual's system is a recognized exigent circumstance.
10.

The chain of custody of the blood drawn by Mr. Davis and

maintained by the State of Utah was not defective; the blood tubes
had not, prior to being tested, been tampered with in any way and
the State did not exhibit any bad faith in the handling, storage or
testing of the blood.

v 1/ \l v

1/ ft

STATE V. RIGGS

11.

PAGE FORTY-FIVE

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

The chain of custody of the state-analyzed blood evidence

was sufficient.
12.

The handling, storage and testing procedures for the

state-analyzed blood did not affect the accuracy of the blood
samples.
13.

The testing procedures for the defendant's state-analyzed

blood were

appropriate, accurate and reliable.

The testing

equipment is standard for blood alcohol testing and the machine was
calibrated and working properly before, during and after the test.
14.

The State established an appropriate chain of custody of

the hospital-analyzed blood, and the defendant does not contest
this chain of custody.
15.

It is unclear whether it was Mr. Davis or Nurse Sadler

who drew the three additional tubes of the defendant's blood.
However, under the totality of the circumstances, the reason these
three additional tubes of blood were drawn related solely to the
defendant's medical treatment and, therefor, does not constitute an
unconstitutional search of the defendant.
16.
to

the

Rule 506(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence is an exception
physician-patient

privilege

and

provides

that

no

physician-patient privilege exists as to information obtained by

STATE V. RIGGS

PAGE FORTY-SIX

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

examination of the patient relevant to an issue of the physical
condition of the patient in any proceeding in which that condition
is an element of any claim in any proceedings in which any party
relies upon the condition as an element of the claim.

In the

instant case, the State of Utah relies on the defendant's blood
alcohol content as an element of its claims that he committed three
counts of Criminal Homicide, Automobile Homicide.

Because the

blood draw itself was a constitutional search, the results of the
hospital-analyzed blood testing are otherwise admissible under Rule
506(d).
17.

The defendant was in custody at all times while he was at

the UUMC.
18.

Although the defendant could have been arrested prior to

7:30 p.m., November 16, 1995, the investigation was ongoing prior
to that time.
19.

The law enforcement officers knew the defendant was to

remain in the hospital and that he was not going to leave the
hospital.

They were not obligated to arrest the defendant prior to

his actual arrest.
20.

None of the conversations between the defendant and

Deputies Hunter, Stratford and Roesler constituted interrogations

r\
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or

trickery

to

elicit

incriminating statements from the defendant.
21.

All of the incriminating statements made by the defendant

to Deputies Hunter, Stratford and Roesler were spontaneous and
voluntary.
22.

At

the

times

the

defendant

made

his

incriminating

statements to Deputies Hunter, Stratford and Roesler, he made the
statements knowingly and voluntarily; his medical condition did not
render him

incapable of making

those

statements

knowingly

and

voluntarily.
DATED this 28th day of June, 1996.
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foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, to the
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Attorney for Plaintiff
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Lisa J. Remal
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424 East 500 South, Suite 300
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ADDENDUM C
Trial Court's Oral Ruling on Motion to Suppress

1

And I would suggest to you that he also knew the results of

2

the blood draw before he was booked into jail.

3

the testimony he stated that he did know the results of the

4

blood draw before booking him into jail.

5

In fact, from

And also Deputy Hunter backs up the fact that they

6

didn't know who the driver of the truck was.

Hunter stated

7

that Stratford relieved him at the hospital on November 14th

8

at 6 o'clock.

9

the hospital to continue investigating the accident and also

And he said that Stratford was coming over to

10

who was driving the truck.

11

investigating who was driving the truck?

12

know who was driving the truck; that was still under

13

investigation.

14

I asked him, Were they still
Yes. They didn't

So what we have with Roberts is that he knew that

15

an accident occurred.

16

knew Danny was the driver because that was still in dispute.

17

So the only thing Roberts knows is that an accident had

18

occurred.

19

There is a question about whether he

THE COURT: All right.

Thank you.

20

I don't believe that will be necessary.

21

I am prepared to make some rulings on the motions

22

that have been argued.

I have heard from the State.

I have

23

heard from the defense, and I have given the defense

24

considerable more time than the State.

25

the memoranda from all counsel and all counsel have touched

But I have also read

i

f

ill. i Z .1 I

57

1

on the arguments that are also in the briefs.

2

considering those as well*

3

So I am

With regard to the statements made by Mr. Riggs,

4

there are four individuals to whom statements were made.

5

Trooper Bairett first of all. These are all analyzed under

6

the Carner factors, and I won't repeat those here, but

7

counsel have cited those in their briefs and I am familiar

8

with those and they were recently reaffirmed by the Utah

9

Supreme Court.

10

Absolutely under the Fifth Amendment no person

11

shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against

12

himself.

13

incrimination is some kind of compulsion.

14

v. U.S.. a Supreme Court opinion.

15"

A necessary element of compulsory selfThat's in Hoffa

Obviously Miranda v. Arizona is the landmark

16

case addressing police interrogation methods. And detailed

17

and under Miranda and its progeny, a warning must be

18

administered to a suspect who is the subject of a custodial

19

interrogation in order to dispel the compulsion inherent in

20

custodial surroundings.

21

mind, the Court addresses each statement.

22

So keeping all these principles in

Let me digress for just a moment, that I will

23

obviously overlook things in this bench ruling that may be

24

consistent with evidence at trial. And in preparing the

25

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, I think the
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1

prevailing party on any issue is entitled to include evidence

2

which is consistent with the Court's ruling.

3

decide whether I make the finding or whether I don't make the

4

finding.

5

And then I will

But in any event, the circumstances were that

6

Trooper Bairett had first observed the truck. Without going

7

into all the details about what happened initially, the truck

8

at a point fled from Trooper Bairett reaching speeds

9

approximately 75 miles an hour, far in excess of what was the

10

limit in the area. And Trooper Bairett was following this

11

vehicle, trying to catch up with it, saw the red light ahead,

12

thought that the vehicle might stop or at least substantially

13

slow down.

14

the vehicle, the truck, went through the red light.

15

other vehicle, the Saturn vehicle, was coming through on a

16

green light from the perpendicular and a collision occurred.

17

And Trooper Bairett saw all this.

18

put on his video recording device in his car.

19

whether this was captured on that video device or not —

20

getting a nod yes.

21

And the brake lights went on temporarily and then
And the

In fact, he had already
I don't know
I sun

I just didn't happen to remember.

In any event, so Trooper Bairett drove up. He

22

went first to the truck which was on its back.

And one

23

individual I believe at that point was trying to get out,

24

either then or a little bit later.

25

person Trooper Bairett identified as the driver of the

But in any event, the
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1

vehicle, having previously been next to the vehicle at a

2

light, was on the passenger side and that he was partially

3

pinned under the truck.

4

He then went to the Saturn and the Saturn car.

5

The force of the collision threw the Saturn into a building.

6

And the Trooper checked on the people who were in the Saturn

7

and then came back to the truck, then went to check another

8

person who had been flung from the car in a grassy area.

9

Then Trooper Bairett came back.

10

At that point Trooper Bairett asked —

11

of this he had arrested, he had actually handcuffed — maybe

12

not actually arrested but he handcuffed the first person who

13

was out of the truck who was making motions to leave.

14

Trooper Bairett also requested other help and also made a

15

call that help would be needed for blood draws.

16

lot of debris around including beer cans, some opened —

17

most of which were closed, but my recollection is some of

18

them may have been opened.

19

during all

There was a
or

Trooper Bairett told the driver of the car, he

20

spoke to Mr. Riggs and he told him that he should lie still

21

until medical personnel arrived.

22

to the passenger that he had handcuffed as "in custody."

23

then during this process he asked him some questions

24

including who was driving, why was he driving, why was

25

Mr. Riggs driving and why did he run from him.

He said that, he referred
And

And I took

ouUS4
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1

from that, in his car, when the truck tried to run away from

2

Trooper Bairett.

3

Now, looking at the Carney factors at the scene

4

of the accident, Mr. Riggs was partially pinned underneath

5

the truck.

6

treatment reasons. Trooper Bairett evidently saw that he had

7

been injured on his head; he didn't know the extent of his

8

injuries.

9

He had been told to lie still for medical

It's a little unclear at what point other officers

10

arrived on the scene in relation to when these statements

11

were made or these questions were made.

12

testimony from Detective Craig that they were treating this

13

as a crime scene.

14

at particular points and he referred to some individuals as

15

arrestees.

16

there was a deputy actually sitting right next to him, and

17

that I believe was the passenger. (Page 43 of the

18

transcript).

19

There certainly was

In fact, deputies were assigned to stand

He said that one arrestee tried to flee and that

In any event, there was some indicia of arrest

20

because there was an officer very close by.

No testimony

21

that the officers who were in the particular areas were

22

within eyesight of Mr. Riggs; I can't really draw conclusions

23

as to that.

24

And these folks were referred to as arrestees.

25

there was in the minds of some of the officers at the scene,

But there was one passenger who was handcuffed.
Certainly
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1
2

there were indicia of arrest.
The questions that were asked were questions.

3

There were only a few questions.

4

of interrogation.

5

which has been cited by counsel, include that —

6

counsel have been discussing here today.

7

It wasn't a full-blown kind

The constitutional law as I understand it,

This Court doesn't write statutes.

are as

This Court, as

8

other judges, is compelled to take oaths to apply and follow

9

the constitution as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court and

10

others. And I, therefore, am compelled to follow the law

11

regardless of how that comes out.

12

As to Trooper Bairett, as I understand the law, I

13

believe that the questions that were asked, who was driving,

14

that question concerned me because Trooper Bairett said he

15

knew who was driving.

16

of thing, a question, it's calling for an admission, I think,

17

where Trooper Bairett said he knew who was driving.

18

And while it's an investigatory kind

There was a question, why was he driving and why

19

did he run from him.

I think under the circumstances, under

20

Carner particularly, that there was some interrogation of

21

Mr. Riggs that went beyond mere investigation because it was

22

in the context where there were other indicia of arrest,

23

where Mr. Riggs was clearly, I'll use the term "not free.to

24

leave," knowing that that's not the test; the test is the

25

Carner test.

But even if he had been able to get out from
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1

under the truck, there was another officer there who was

2

keeping somebody else right at the scene.

3

officers around.

4

There were other

Accordingly, the defendant's motion is granted as

5

to that particular statement.

6

that he was driving because the others were too drunk to

7

drive•

8
9

And the statement there was

As to Detective Stratford, in that situation the
site was in the hospital.

There had been guards there for

10

some time.

11

the people —

12

were people threatening Mr. Riggs and Mr. Riggs family,

13

evidently, had made some —

14

believe that they might try to remove Mr. Riggs from the

15

hospital.

16

were no problems, to protect Mr. Riggs, and to insure that he

17

did not leave the hospital or at least was not taken out of

18

the hospital by Mr. Riggs1 family.

19

First they were ordered there to make sure that
because the hospital had indicated that there

had caused the hospital to

So the guards were there to make sure that there

With regard to the statements that were made, at

20

that point I don't think there is really any dispute that the

21

investigation had focused on Mr. Riggs as a possible suspect

22

or that he was a suspect and that the investigation was

23

focused on him.

Clearly there was some objective indicia of

24

arrest, namely:

that there was a guard there. And at that

25

point, by the time Mr. Stratford appeared, he was there also
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1

to make sure that Mr. Riggs was not leaving.

2

Now, Detective Stratford made some questions

3

initially or proposed some questions to Mr. Riggs initially,

4

did he remember the accident.

5

that are in dispute here. The statement that is made that is

6

at dispute is that Mr. Riggs knew that the vehicle was

7

stolen.

8

being put to Mr. Riggs. Mr. Stratford was there, not a long

9

period of time, but there were no questions before Mr. Riggs.

There was no responses there

At the time that this was made, no questions were

10

And, in fact, at that time Mr. Stratford was speaking with

11

the other detective who was there.

12

Statements that are volunteered are — well,

13

voluntary statements made, spontaneous statements made by a

14

suspect may be admissible if, in fact, they are spontaneous

15

statements.

16

discussion, as I assess all of this, it is my finding that

17

this was a spontaneous statement.

18

statement is admissible at trial.

19

Given a review of the entire context of the

And that, therefore, the

As to Detective Hunter —

and I may be getting

20

their titles wrong but I will call them Detective Hunter and

21

Detective Roesler —

22

room.

23

hospital.

24

that I discussed previously.

25

Mr. Riggs could not have gotten up and left that room, that

Detective Hunter was a guard in the

He did not interrogate Mr. Riggs.

It was in the

It was at a time he was sent there for the reasons
And I think it can be said that
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1

Detective Hunter would not have permitted that to happen.

2

other words, if Mr. Riggs tried to leave the hospital, I have

3

no doubt that Detective Hunter would have prevented him from

4

leaving.

5

In

Under the circumstances, the investigators had

6

focused their investigation on him.

7

That is indicia for arrest.

8

time.

9

witness.

The guard was present.

They had talked for a period of

Frankly, I found Detective Hunter to be a credible
I have considered the arguments that have been made

10

about Detective Hunter, but Detective Hunter was in my

11

opinion a credible witness. And I do not believe he was

12

interrogating in any way Mr. Riggs at the time that Mr. Riggs

13

made the statement that he knew the car was stolen and that

14

he would have lost the cop but for the accident.

15

there wasn't a scene —

16

atmosphere was such that there was an element of compulsion

17

on the part of Mr. Riggs in making the spontaneous statement.

18

That there was not an atmosphere of interrogation or that the

19

circumstances were such or the discussion was such that the

20

officer —

21

discussion was reasonably or likely to elicit incriminating

22

statements from Mr. Riggs. And accordingly, the Court denies

23

the Motion in Limine as to those statements made to Detective

24

Hunter.

25

And that

I am not persuaded that the

or that it was reasonable or likely —

their

As to Detective Roesler, again the Court found
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1

this detective to be credible.

2

about the log, the hospital log.

3

nevertheless —

4

Detective Roesler did not recall a specific conversation

5

other than the conversation that Mr. Riggs or the statement

6

that he made that he did it, he was as guilty as hell. That

7

Detective Roesler struck me as an individual who had focused

8

on what, to him, was the single most important comment made.

9

I don't consider the comment
I am aware of that.

But

and I have also considered the fact that

And that the nature of their conversation before

10

was very casual and it was not reasonably or likely to elicit

11

incriminating responses from Mr. Riggs.

12

came up first, what about the jail, you know; he was worried

13

about going to the Salt Lake County Jail.

14

officer do something else.

15

That this actually

Perhaps could the

Well, then the officer actually stated, and I

16

found it to be completely credible that he actually advised

17

Mr. Riggs to talk to his attorney and thereby discourage

18

Mr. Riggs from making further statements like that.

19

was after that that Mr. Riggs made the statement, "I did it,

20

I'm as guilty as hell.91

21

inappropriate in any way.

22

interrogation or an atmosphere created that was reasonably

23

calculated or likely to lead to incriminating statements

24

being made by Mr. Riggs.

25

And it

So I do not believe that is
And I find that there was no

Now, as to the voluntariness of this because of
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1

his medical condition, the claim essentially is that these

2

were not voluntary because, first of all, he had made some

3

statements because of his head jury and also because of his

4

subsequent medication.

5

cross examination.

6

matter of law to justify a ruling that this was involuntary

7

for those reasons.

8

to be presented to the jury.

This is a subject and fodder for

I think I do not find anything as a

I think those are fact issues that need

9

With regard to the blood draw, my understanding of

10

the law is that in a situation like this where there are many

11

individuals, it's a complicated, extensive investigation,

12

there were several vehicles and officers at the scene, that

13

it need not be only the searching officer —

14

the officer who was actually at the hospital who has been

15

instructed to go there — who must have probable cause.

16

in other words,

And I frankly did not focus on Detective Roberts,

17

what he knew.

18

in fact, I want to read the Dorsey case —

19

a supplemental ruling as to him when I have read the Dorsey

20

case. And then I will go through and look very specifically

21

at the probable cause, if any exists, as to Detective

22

Roberts, if after reading that case I am persuaded that it

23

must be Detective Roberts who must have probable cause to

24

proceed with the draw.

25

I would be happy to read the Dorsey case

~

and I will enter

There is no dispute that Detective Roberts was
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ADDENDUM D
Flight Instruction

INSTRUCTION NO.

^°>

The flight or attempted flight of a person immediately after
the commission of a crime or after that person is accused of a
crime that has been committed, is not sufficient in itself to
establish

the

defendant's

guilt.

However,

such

flight, if

proved, may be considered by you in light of all other proven
facts in the case in determining guilt or innocence.
Although consciousness of guilt may be inferred from flight,
it

does

not

necessarily

reflect

actual

guilt

of

the

crime

charged, and there may be reasons for flight fully consistent
with innocence.

Therefore, whether or not evidence of flight

shows a consciousness of guilt and the significance, if any, to
be attached to any such evidence are matters exclusively within
the province of the jury.
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